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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding in the Third District
Court were the plaintiffs, Dr. M. Dalton Cannon and Mrs.
Patricia Cannon (the "Cannons"), and defendant the University of
Utah (the "University").

Prior to the entry of judgment in this

case, another defendant, Ms. Malissa K. Austin, settled with
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs' claims against her were dismissed
with prejudice.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The only determinative statutory or rule provisions in
this appeal are as follows:
1.

Rule 56(c), U. R. C. P. , which states as follows:

Rule 56.

Summary judgment.

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(Emphasis added).
2.

Rule 6(d), U. R. C. P. , which states as follows:

Rule 6.

Time.

(d) For motions -- Affidavits. A
written motion, other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served not later than 5 days
before the time specified for the hearing,
unless a different period is fixed by these
rules or by order of the court. Such an
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte
application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with
the motion; and, except as otherwise provided
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be
served not later than 1 day before the
hearing, unless the court permits them to be
served at some other time. (Emphasis added).
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard
Moffat presiding.

This appeal was originally taken to the Utah

Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The

appeal was subsequently assigned by the Utah Supreme Court to
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented by this appeal, and the
appropriate standard of review for each, are as follows:
1.

Did the trial court err in ruling in this

negligence action that the University owed no duty of care to
the Cannons, on the basis of the "public duty" doctrine?

This

issue presents a question of law, and the trial court' s decision
is to be reviewed for correctness, without according deference
to its conclusions.

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P. 2d 497, 499 (Utah

1989); Jones v. American Coin Portfolios. Inc.. 709 P. 2d 303,
306 (Utah 1985).
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the

University owed no duty of care to the Cannons as business
g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

invitees of the University?

This issue also presents a question

of law, and the standard of review is the same as for issue #1.
3.

Did the trial court rely upon disputed issues of

material fact in ruling that the University owed no duty of care
to the Cannons?

In reviewing the trial court' s decision

granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals must view the
facts in the record, together with all inferences fairly arising
from the facts, in the light most favorable to the Cannons, and
affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Provo Citv Corp. v. State, 795 P. 2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1990).

The

trial court' s legal conclusions in granting summary judgment are
reviewed simply for correctness, and no deference is accorded to
such conclusions.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d

634 (1979).
4.

Did the trial court err in striking the

affidavits of Dr. Cannon and plaintiffs' traffic safety expert,
Mr. David Lord, as untimely pursuant to U. R. C. P. Rule 6(d) and
inadmissible under U. R. C. P. 56(e)?

The issue of timeliness is a

question of law, and subject to review for correctness without
deference.

The sufficiency of Dr. Cannon' s and Mr. Lord' s

affidavits in the context of a motion for summary judgment is a

-2g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

question of law.

American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lockhead. 751

P. 2d 271 (Utah App. 1988).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arose from an auto-pedestrian accident on

the University of Utah campus on the evening of February 1,
1990.

The appellants, Dr. M. Dalton Cannon and Mrs. Patricia

Cannon, were en route to a University of Utah basketball game
when they were struck by an automobile while using a crosswalk
across South Campus Drive adjacent to the Huntsman Center. R.
250-251.l

The Cannons were critically injured, and remain

seriously and permanently disabled.
That evening, the University had specifically assigned
two University of Utah police officers to assist pedestrians
using the crosswalk across South Campus Drive en route to the
basketball game, in accordance with the University' s normal
practice.

R. 327, 329.

At the time of the accident, the

officers were sitting in their car at the crosswalk talking.
Citations to the record of proceedings before the trial court
are set forth as " R
. " No transcript was made of the summary
judgment hearing.
-3g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

R.

287,

329, 330.

Neither officer attempted to assist the Cannons

across the crosswalk, or tried to control approaching vehicular
traffic.

There was additional evidence that the officers had

allowed flares marking the crosswalk to approaching vehicular
traffic to burn down prior to the accident.

R. 251, 327, 396.

In deposition testimony, University police officers
stated that it was the specific duty of officers assigned to the
crosswalk prior to basketball games to assist pedestrians across
the crosswalk and to control vehicular traffic in the immediate
vicinity of the crosswalk.

The officer supervising the accident

investigation testified that this task could not be performed
adequately without the officers being out of the police vehicle
and actively involved in controlling pedestrian and vehicular
traffic.
Based on these and other facts, Dr. and Mrs. Cannon
filed this action against the University for the injuries they
suffered as a result of the negligent conduct of its employee
police officers.

The Cannons also sued the driver of the car

that hit them, Ms. Malissa Austin.

Prior to the entry of

judgment in this case, Ms. Austin settled with the Cannons,
leaving the University as the sole defendant.

-4g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
On February 11, 1992, the defendant University of Utah

moved for summary judgment in this proceeding, claiming that the
University officers owed no duty of care to the Cannons, and
that any negligent conduct by the officers was not the proximate
cause of the Cannons' injuries.2

By Memorandum Decision dated

March 10, 1992, the Third District Court, Hon. Richard Moffat
presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
University of Utah on the basis that the University officers
owed no duty of care toward the Cannons pursuant to the "public
duty" doctrine.

R. 430-435.

The court additionally rejected

the Cannons claim that a duty of care was created by their
status as business invitees of the University, and struck two
affidavits filed by the Cannons in opposition to the
University' s motion. Id.

The Court made no ruling on the

University' s claim that proximate causation was not present. 3

2

At the time of this motion, the parties stipulated to the
voluntary dismissal of the Cannons' claims that the University had
negligently failed to maintain adequate lighting and signage in the
vicinity of the crosswalk. R. 436-437.
3

However, the Court stated that it was granting summary
judgment on the duty of care issue, and for the reasons set forth
in the University' s memorandum. This issue is discussed in Part
IV. C. of the brief.
-5g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

A Judgment and Order of Dismissal was entered by the
Court on March 24, 1992.

R. 441-442.

Notice of Appeal on March 27, 1992.
1992,

The Cannons filed their
R. 443-446.

On June 15,

this appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to

the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Cannons were struck by an automobile while in

a pedestrian crosswalk on the University of Utah campus en route
to a University of Utah basketball game at approximately 6: 58
p.m. on the evening of February 1, 1990. R. 176/ 250.

The

Cannons, who were in their late sixties at the time, were
critically injured in the accident, and both are substantially
and permanently disabled. R. 177.
2.

Two University of Utah police officers, Officer

Kim Beglarian and Officer Brian Purvis, had been specifically
assigned that evening to assist pedestrians across the crosswalk
in question, which is located on South Campus Drive adjacent to
the Huntsman Center. R, 327, 329.
3.

The Cannons had used the crosswalk prior to

basketball games in the past, and police officers had generally

-6g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

been at the crosswalk, with flares lit, actively directing
traffic.

R, 327.
4.

The lead investigator for the University Police

Department, Officer Mike McPharlin, testified in his deposition
that in order to perform their assigned crosswalk duties
properly, the officers needed to have been out of their car. R.
329.
5.

Officer McPharlin additionally stated that a

pedestrian using the crosswalk should have had contact with the
officers prior to using the crosswalk, because it was the duty
of the officers to advise pedestrians when to cross. R. 329.

It

was the specific duty and responsibility of the officer to be on
the lookout for pedestrian traffic, and to decide whether to
stop the pedestrian. Id.
6.

Officer Beglarian acknowledged that their

assignment specifically required the duty to assist pedestrians
by stopping traffic until the pedestrians made it across the
crosswalk. R. 327.

Officer Beglarian further stated that the

purpose of the officers' presence at the crosswalk was
pedestrian safety. R. 329.

Their normal procedure would have

been to help the Cannons across the crosswalk. Id.

-7g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

The officers

were supposed to check pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and to
stop one while the other proceeded. Id.
7.

That evening, the officers had been out of

their car helping pedestrians, but had gotten back in their car
prior to the time of the accident.

R. 329.

However, at the

time of the accident, approximately 28 minutes after their
duties commenced at 6:30 p.m. [R. 251], both officers were
sitting in their car, trying to stay warm, talking and possibly
listening to the radio. R. 287/ 329# 330.
8.

There were other pedestrians in the area at the

time the accident occurred. R. 328.

Officers Purvis and

Beglarian would watch for pedestrians from their car, and then
get out and assist them.

R. 329. Even the presence of only one

pedestrian would have triggered this obligation.

R. 288.

However, the Cannons walked directly in front of the officers'
car seconds before the accident, and the officers did not see
them.

R. 328-330.
9.

Where it was located, their car would have

partially blocked the view of westbound traffic of pedestrians
using the crosswalk.

R. 330.

Officer Beglarian did not believe

that lighting at the crosswalk was adequate.

-8g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

R. 330.

10.

The purpose of the flares set by the officers was

to warn approaching traffic of pedestrians.

R. 330.

Although

the officers stated that the flares they had set to mark the
crosswalk to approaching traffic were still burning (albeit
burning down), neither Dr. Cannon nor the driver of the vehicle,
Ms. Malissa Austin, saw flares burning at the time of the
accident.

R. 327.
11.

The officers set flares out at the crosswalk when

they arrived at the crosswalk around 6: 30.

R. 251.

Flares such

as those used can burn out in 25 minutes or less in adverse
weather conditions.

R. 396.

It had been snowing or raining

intermittently as recently as five to ten minutes before the
accident.

R. 396.

According to Dr. Cannon, the officers' car

did not have its flashers on, although one of the officers
stated that they had their amber flashers on.

R. 289/ 293.

The

investigating officer testified that normally the car' s red and
blue emergency lights should have been on to alert vehicular
traffic of activity in the area. R. 367.
12.

Men' s basketball games at the University of Utah

are revenue-producing events for which admission is generally
charged.

The general public is invited, and the University

-9g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

promotes the games using radio and television advertising, in
order to increase attendance. R. 371.
13.

The University makes parking areas on the south

side of South Campus Drive, across from the Huntsman Center,
available for use by spectators attending University basketball
games. R. 371.

The Cannons utilized this parking on the night

of the accident, and were proceeding northbound to the Huntsman
Center, attempting to cross South Campus Drive, when they were
hit.

R. 426-428.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, a court
is required to view all facts, and the inferences that can be
drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

The Cannons presented the Court with facts

clearly establishing the existence of a duty of care owed to
them by the University police officers assigned to guard the
crosswalk where the accident occurred. 4

4

The trial court

The Cannons believe that the deposition testimony set forth
in their Memorandum In Opposition to the Defendant' s Motion for
Summary Judgment was alone sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
The trial court erroneously struck two additional affidavits filed
by the Cannons in opposition to the University's motion. These
affidavits provided a ^itional admissible factual material
precluding summary judgment, and should have been considered by the
court. See Part IV, infra.
-10g.\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

instead founded its ruling upon facts disputed by the Cannons,
and reached legal conclusions that were contrary to the record
before it.

Its decision should be reversed and this case

remanded for trial.
The trial court' s decision was based primarily upon
the "public duty" doctrine set forth in Ferree v. State. 784 P.
2d 149 (Utah 1989).

Based upon that doctrine, the court ruled

that the Cannons had failed to prove that the University owed
them some specific duty of care, rather than a general duty owed
to members of the public to ensure traffic safety.

The trial

court' s ruling glosses over a crucial and undisputed fact: the
police officers in question were specifically assigned to assist
pedestrians across the crosswalk prior to the basketball game,
thus creating a duty of care toward those pedestrians.

The law

is clear that when a governmental entity voluntarily assumes a
task, it assumes a duty to perform that task non-negligently.
The officers admitted that their assignment required active
involvement with pedestrians and vehicles at the crosswalk, yet
they were sitting in their car talking and listening to the
radio at the time of the accident.
difficult to dispute.
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Their negligence is

The trial court shoehorned this case into the public
duty doctrine by relying upon the University' s arguable lack of
a duty to provide traffic control at the crosswalk in the first
place.5

The court equated the absence of a duty to assign the

officers to the crosswalk in the first place with the officers'
failure to perform their assigned task once they got there.
Because the University had no duty to provide traffic control/
the officers also had no duty to do so, despite their
assignment.

This premise both misstates the law and relies on

disputed facts. The officers were in fact engaged that evening
in traffic control; the evidence shows that they simply were
failing to do so competently at the time of the accident.

The

Cannons also suggest that this ruling is highly undesirable from
a policy standpoint; the trial court would relieve governmental
employees from liability only if they completely ignored their
assigned task.

Finally, the trial court disregarded factual

evidence that the officers were actively negligent, by parking
their car in a manner that obscured pedestrians from oncoming

5

The Cannons contend that their status as business invitees
of the University created a duty of care in the University' s
employees to act non-negligently when on property owned or occupied
by the University. See Part IV, infra.
-12g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

traffic and by allowing marker flares to burn down or out at the
crosswalk. 6
As business invitees of the University, the Cannons
were also entitled to have the University and its employees
exercise due care to protect their safety in all areas under the
University' s control.

The trial court denied this claim because

the street underlying the crosswalk is owned by the Utah
Department of Transportation, not the University.

However,

applicable law (as expressed in the Restatement 2d of Torts)
provides that occupation of property, not ownership, is
determinative when an invitee relationship is alleged.

The

University police officers were clearly in occupation and
control of the crosswalk, and owed those using it a duty of
care.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE "PUBLIC DUTY" DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE
WHERE A RISK OP HARM TO IDENTIFIABLE
INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS ARISES FROM THE
DEFENDANT' S NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
6

The Cannons flatly dispute, on the basis of convincing
deposition testimony, that the marker flares were still burning at
the time of the accident, yet the trial court stated that there was
"sufficient evidence" to believe the contrary. R. 433. The court's
weighing of the evidence is improper on summary judgment.
-13g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

A.

The Public Duty Doctrine In Utah.
The "public duty" doctrine, upon which the trial

court's decision was based, has been the subject of considerable
litigation in Utah' s courts in recent years. See e. a. Rollins v.
Petersen. 813 P. 2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991); Ferree v. State. 784
P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989); Little v. Utah State Piv. of Family
g^ryices, 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1983); Lflfligirr Yt Utah P9Ptt Of
Transportation, 828 P. 2d 535 (Utah 1992).

The public duty

doctrine has been succinctly defined as stating that "a duty to
all is a duty to none. " Lamarr. supra. 828 P. 2d at 539.7 The
Utah Supreme Court has defined the doctrine more broadly as
follows:
For a governmental agency and its agents to
be liable for a negligently caused injury
suffered by a member of the public, the
plaintiff must show a breach of duty owed
him as an individual, not merely the breach
of an obligation owed to the general public
at large by the governmental official.
Ferree v. State, supra. 784 P. 2d at 151.
In the absence of a specific rather than a general
duty, the "special relationship" necessary for a duty of care is
not present.

£££ Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P. 2d 413

7

Citing Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P. 2d 1156, 1165 (Utah
1991)(Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-14g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

(Utah 1986).

Because the existence of a duty of care is an

essential element of a negligence claim, the public duty
doctrine, if applicable, precludes a plaintiff from recovering
damages for negligence from a governmental employee. 8
The Cannons agree that the public duty doctrine, as it
has been stated by Utah' s appellate courts, remains the law in
Utah.9

In this case, however, the trial court misinterpreted

the doctrine, and additionally relied upon disputed material
facts to apply it to the Cannons,

Summary judgment was

therefore inappropriate.

B.

Lack of An Identifiable Risk of Harm to Specific
Individuals or Groups la the Common Factor In Utah' s
Reported Public Duty Cases.
The reported Utah public duty cases have been based

upon a factual pattern that is clearly distinguishable from the
instant case.

Where the courts have found the public duty

doctrine applicable, there has been no identifiable person or
8

Sovereign immunity is not an issue in this appeal. The
University admits that it may be held liable for the negligent acts
or omissions of its employees, Officers Purvis and Beglarian. R.
257.
9

In Rollins, supra. Justice Durham of the Utah Supreme Court
argued in her partial dissent for the abolition of the public duty
doctrine.
Other western states have abolished the doctrine in
recent years. See e. g. Leake v. Cain. 720 P. 2d 152 (Colo- 1986).
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class of persons that forseeably could be harmed by the
allegedly negligent conduct.

The distinction is crucial.

In

Ferree v. State, 784 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989), the case upon which
the trial court here based its ruling, an inmate at a community
corrections facility became intoxicated and murdered a total
stranger while on a weekend release.

The victim' s family sued

the Department of Corrections, claiming that the Department' s
negligence in supervising the inmate' s release was a proximate
cause of the victim' s death.

The Utah Supreme Court held that

the Department did not owe a duty of care to the decedent,
because the Department of Corrections' general duty to protect
public safety could not extend to the protection of unknown
parties from future violent acts by parolees, in the absence of
knowledge that a specific individual or group might be in
danger.
In Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P. 2d 1156 (Utah 1991), an
escaped mental patient injured the plaintiff, a stranger, in a
car accident on Interstate 15.

The Supreme Court understandably

held that the defendant mental health facility' s duty to
exercise care in controlling patients did not create any
enforceable duty to unidentifiable persons who might somehow be
injured after an escape.

In Lamarr v. Utah Dept. of
-16-
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Transportation, 828 P. 2d 535 (Utah App. 1992), the plaintiff
was harassed by transients under the North Temple viaduct in
Salt Lake City, leading him to avoid the pedestrian walkway by
walking on the roadway, where he was subsequently hit by a car.
He then claimed that the city had a duty to control the
transient population to prevent injuries to persons such as
himself.

The Court of Appeals held that the City had no way of

knowing of Lamarr' s activities, and no reason to distinguish
Lamarr from any other member of the public, so no duty of care
existed.

828 P. 2d at 540.
These cases all involve a common and readily

distinguishable fact pattern.

The defendants, while having a

general duty to perform their duties properly, had no means of
identifying the persons who might be harmed by their alleged
negligence.

In the absence of a person or persons who could

forseeably be harmed, no actionable duty of care could be found
to exist.

In contrast, where there is a reasonably identifiable

risk of harm to a specific person or group, a "special
relationship" giving rise to a duty of care exists.
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Rollins.

gwra, 813 P. 2d at 1162.

5£S.frlgpLittle v. Utah State

Division of Family Services, supra, 667 P. 2d 49. 10
The Court should note that, in order to escape the
public duty doctrine, the plaintiff need not be identifiable as
an individual.

Instead, the plaintiff need merely be part of a

reasonably identifiable group.
1156,

1162 (Utah 1991).

Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P. 2d

The Court in Rollins indicated that if

harm was likely to a distinct group as a result of a
governmental defendant' s failure to act with due care, an
actionable duty of care existed toward that group. Id.

c.

Pedestrians Using the Crosswalk
Clearly Were At Rial;
7
As a Result of The Officers Negligence.
The trial court' s Memorandum Decision is based in

large part upon the conclusion that the Cannons proved no duty
on the part of the officers toward them as specific individuals,
rather than as members of the general public, R. 433.

Under

Rollins, the Cannons were not required to do so; they instead
simply needed to show that they were part of an identifiable
class of people which was forseeably at risk.
10

See also 18 E.

In Little, the Supreme Court found that a governmental
social agency was liable for harm to a child in foster care, where
the possibility of harm to that child from the agency' s negligent
acts was foreseeable.
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McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations. Sec. 53. 04b at 165
(3d Ed. 1985)(duty can exist to class of individuals as well as
individual persons).
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the facts
in the record, and all fair inferences from those facts, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant.

The record

here demonstrates that the University recognized the danger to
pedestrians crossing busy campus streets immediately prior to
University basketball games.

In order to protect those

pedestrians, it assigned University police to guard the South
Campus Drive crosswalk prior to the games.

Those officers were

specifically aware that their assigned task was to be out of
their car advising pedestrians when to cross the crosswalk and
stopping vehicular traffic.

On the night of the accident, the

weather had been bad, and visibility was poor, increasing the
risks of an auto-pedestrian accident.

The officers were aware

of the danger that the crosswalk presented under the
circumstances.

The officers obviously could have foreseen that

game spectators using the crosswalk (an identifiable class of
individuals) would be subject to harm if the officers failed to
perform their crossing duties competently.

Under Rollins, the

officers owed a duty of care to those persons.
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II.
THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE,
BECAUSE THE DIVERSITY ASSUMED A DUTY OP
CARE TO PEDIJTRIANS AT THE CROSSWALK BY
ASSIGNING OFFICERS TO GUARD IT.
A.

Once A Governmental Entity Voluntarily Assumes A Task.

It Is Required to Perform That Task In A Non-Negligent
Manner.
The public duty doctrine involves an inquiry into
whether the relationship between the parties gives rise to a
duty of care.

In this case, however, there is no need for such

inquiry, because the University expressly assumed a duty to act
non-negligently when it assigned the officers to guard the
crosswalk on the evening of the accident.

Once a government

entity assumes a specific duty towards individuals, it has an
obligation to act with due care. filling, supra, citing Little
v. Utah State Division of Family Services. 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah
1983).

This principle was recently discussed by the Court of

Appeals in Jones Vt PovmUfyq QitY, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,
P. 2d

(Utah App. 1992).

In Jones. the plaintiff claimed

that the city of Bountiful should have erected signage to
prevent accidents at an intersection known to be dangerous.

The

Court of Appeals rejected this contention, but stated that once
the City did choose to erect signs, it had a duty to do so in a
non-negligent manner.

187 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24, citing 19 E.
-20-
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McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations Sec. 54. 28b at 90
(3d Ed. 1985).
Other courts have similarly ruled that where a
governmental entity assumes the responsibility of providing some
service, it concurrently assumes a duty of care to provide that
service competently.

In Florence v. Goldberg. 375 N. E. 2d. 763

(N. Y. App. 1978), the defendant school district supplied a
crossing guard near a public school for several weeks, but then
negligently failed to schedule a guard on a particular day.

In

the absence of the guard, a child was forced to cross
unassisted, and was hit by a car. The New York court expressly
held that the public duty doctrine did not apply to prevent the
school board from being held liable.

It noted that the

municipality might have had no duty in the first place to
provide a crossing guard for the protection of the public.
However, once the defendant voluntarily assumed the task, it had
the duty to perform the task non-negligently.

375 N. E. 2d at

766; &££.fil&fiVefrCft Vr CitY Qf Phpenix, 427 P. 2d 335 (Ariz.
1967).
The trial court recognized that officers Purvis and
Beglarian had been assigned by their superiors to help people
across South Campus Drive. R. 434.
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However, it then ruled that

the assumption of this obligation did not extend the duty
otherwise owed by the officers. Id.

This ruling confuses the

University' s original obligation to provide traffic control in
the first place with performance of that task.

Under the public

duty rule, the University may arguably have had no obligation to
provide traffic control at the crosswalk in the first place. n
Once it chose to do so, however, it had an obligation to do so
competently and non-negligently.

Utah' s law is clear that the

University' s failure to fulfil its voluntarily assumed duty to
this group is actionable under relevant law.

See Rollins,

?VPya; Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, gyiprft,
667 P. 2d at 53-54.
The University police officer investigating the
accident, Officer Mike McPharlin, acknowledged that an officer
could protect pedestrians only by being out of the car and
halting pedestrians at the curb while traffic passed.

Instead,

officers Purvis and Beglarian were sitting in their car with the
heater on, talking and perhaps listening to the radio.

This

forced the Cannons to attempt to cross the street without the
11

The Cannons contend that the University and its employees
had a duty of care to invitees to its athletic events, and that
this duty existed independently of whether any duty of care was
assumed by the University. See Part VI, infra.
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normal level of police assistance, with catastrophic results.
The University undertook to protect the safety of pedestrians
using the Huntsman Center crosswalk.

This created a "special

relationship" between the University and those pedestrians.

A

duty to exercise reasonable care to protect pedestrians at the
crosswalk existed under the circumstances.
Other courts dealing with crosswalk accidents have had
no hesitancy in ruling that, once the government undertakes to
provide crosswalk safety, it assumes a duty of care to those
using the crosswalk. Alhambra School District v. Superior Court,
796 P. 2d 470, 474 (Ariz. 1990).

The Alhambra court stated:

Although pedestrians are not absolutely
required to use crosswalks to cross a
street, it is certainly foreseeable that
pedestrians might conclude . . . that use of a
marked crosswalk would be the prudent thing
to do. A pedestrian might reasonably rely
on the added safety of a marked crosswalk particularly a school crosswalk, with its
additional protections.
We conclude, therefore, that in creating the
mayfrefl CypggWfrlk Where none previously
exAstefl, the District created a relationship
with those who would use the crosswalk, and
thereby 3gg\unefl » forty Qi refrgonfrfrle ggtpe
with respect to its operation. 796. P. 2d at
474 (Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, not only was there a marked
crosswalk, but also uniformed University police officers whose
-23g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

sole function was to make pedestrian crossings safe.

The

Cannons had used the crosswalk for years, and had always been
afforded this protection.

It is apparent that the University

assumed the duty of protecting "those who would use the
crosswalk, and thereby assumed a duty of reasonable care with
respect to its operation. "

Alhambra School District, supra. 796

P. 2d at 474.
The facts and law set forth in Alhambra and Florence
are directly on point here.

The University may not have been

obligated under law to provide police protection at the
crosswalk, but it chose to assume responsibility for doing so.
It specifically assigned two officers to do one thing - protect
pedestrian safety at the crosswalk on that evening.

The

officers then utterly failed to comply with the duties they were
sent to perform.

This failure is actionable under Utah law.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON
DISPUTED PACTS, AND IGNORED
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT RAISED BY
THE CANNONS

A.

The Trial Court's Ruling Is Based Upon A Misconception

of the Facte.
As one of the foundations of its ruling, the trial
relied upon the factual conclusion that the officers were not
engaged in traffic control activities at the time of the
accident. R. 434.

The court somehow equated the officers'

failure to perform their assigned task at the crosswalk with the
University' s arguable lack of a duty to send them there in the
first place. Id.

The court' s logic is faulty; it is the

equivalent of ruling that a lifeguard who stays in his chair
when he sees a drowning child should be absolved from liability
because he was not conducting lifesaving activities.

More

importantly, the court was making an inherently factual
determination concerning what the officers were and should have
been doing.

This is an issue of material fact sufficient to bar

summary judgment.

Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources. 627 P.

2d 56, 59 (1981)(a single issue of material fact is sufficient
to prevent summary judgment).
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The trial court' s ruling reflects the University' s
argument that, because the officers were sitting in their car
rather than directing traffic as assigned, the Cannons did not
rely upon their presence in attempting to cross the street.

The

University relies on a brief statement in Dr. Cannon' s
deposition, in which he stated that when he and his wife arrived
at the crosswalk, the police who were usually present to assist
them were nowhere in evidence.

As a result, they were forced to

cross the street without assistance, and were hit in the
crosswalk.
Even if taken as true, the contention that the Cannons
did not rely on the officers to cross the street does not
absolve the officers of responsibility.

In Florence v.

Goldberg, supra, the Court found liability where no officers had
been present at a crosswalk; the omission of assistance was the
determinative factor.

Here, the investigating officer clearly

indicated that it was necessary for the officers to be out of
their car stopping traffic and/or pedestrians to perform their
assigned task effectively.

One of the officers similarly

acknowledged that they needed to meet and stop pedestrians in
the face of oncoming traffic to perform their assigned task
effectively.

Their assigned duty also included advising
-26-
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pedestrians when to cross the street.

The fact that the Cannons

were been forced by the officers' inaction to cross the street
without assistance is itself indicative of a negligent failure
to act.

In this situation, a duty of care includes the

obligation to act affirmatively if necessary to prevent injury
to those entrusted to the actor' s care. See Prosser & Keeton On
Torts § 56 at 376-377 (5th Lawyers Ed. 1984). In any event, this
is an inherently factual determination, and one that is disputed
by the Cannons. 12

B.

The Existence offtDuty of Care Is a Question of Fact
The Cannons agree that the existence of a duty of care

is generally an issue of law.

However, when the facts upon

which the issue must be decided are in dispute, summary judgment
is improper.

Egtfrte pf TgiAfrgiieviQh yt City gf HMfflpnfl, 383

12

In his affidavit, stricken by the Court as untimely and
immaterial, Dr. Cannon stated that one of the reasons that the
Cannons used the crosswalk in question was the availability of
police assistance in crossing the street.
The Cannon affidavit
clearly raises material factual questions concerning the issue of
reliance. The Cannons have appealed the trial court' s striking of
his affidavit, because it was filed in accordance with the time
requirements of U. R. C. P. 6(d), and was otherwise admissible.
However, the Cannons believe that the Court of Appeals can decide
the issue of duty in their favor, without reference to the
affidavits.
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N. E. 2d 1081 (Ind. App. 1978).

In that case, the court denied

summary judgment to a governmental entity that claimed that the
public duty ru~e absolved it of liability to the plaintiff.

The

court noted that disputes of fact existed concerning whether
there was some reasonably apparent danger to the plaintiff that
might create a duty.

383 N. E. 2d at 1085.

Similar disputes

exist here.
The Court should also note that the officers' failure
to assist the Cannons is not the only allegation of negligence
here.

The Cannons contend that the officers had allowed marker

flares at the crossing to burn down or go out, increasing the
likelihood that a driver would be unable to see the Cannons, or
be placed on notice o: a potential hazard.

Neither the Cannons

nor the driver of the car saw flares, and even the officers
admitted that the flares were burning down.

There was further

evidence that the flares could burn down in 25 minutes or less
in wet and windy conditions such as the night in question, which
could lead to the inference that the flares were not burning at
the time of the accident.13

Yet the trial court stated as a

13

The Cannons also con^nd that the officers also parked in
the middle lane of South Campus Drive, obscuring pedestrians from
the view of westbound drivers. Together with the officers' failure
to perform their assigned task of actively assisting pedestrians
across the crosswalk, these negligent acts made it highly
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basis for its ruling that "...there is sufficient evidence to
believe that there were flares burning in the crosswalk. ..."
433.

R.

This sort of weighing of disputed evidence is improper on

summary judgment, and justifies reversal.

See Barnes Co. v.

Sohio Natural Resources, supra. 627 P. 2d at 59.

C.

The Trial Court's Decision la Bad Public Policy.
The trial court' s decision, if affirmed by this court,

would create a disincentive toward safe behavior by governmental
employees.

To perform their assigned job, officers Purvis and

Beglarian admittedly had to be out of their car, stopping
traffic or pedestrians until the other passed.
do so.

They failed to

Yet the trial court relied on their nonfeasance as a

factor supporting its ruling.

The court reasoned that, because

the officers were not performing their duty, the Cannons could
not have relied upon them, and no duty of care existed.

This

ruling would discourage active involvement in protecting public
safety, and reward those who shirk their duties.

By remaining

removed from potentially dangerous situations, an employee could
escape liability entirely, while taking action to protect public

foreseeable that a driver could hit the Cannons.
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safety would pose higher risks of litigation.

This is exactly

the opposite of what the Utah legislature has sought to
encourage with the Utah "Good Samaritan Act" and other
legislation.

Sound public policy dictates that the trial

court' s ruling be set aside.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING DR.
CANNON' S AFFIDAVIT

A.

The Affidavit WAS Timely.
The hearing on the University' s Motion for Summary

Judgment was held on Friday, March 6, 1992.

The University

filed and served its reply memorandum in the case on the
afternoon of Wednesday, March 4.

In that reply memorandum, the

University raised in detail for the first time factual and legal
contentions concerning the Cannons' reliance upon the officers'
presence at the crosswalk.

To rebut these contentions, the

Cannons the next day filed the Affidavit of M. Dalton Cannon.
The affidavit was filed and served upon counsel for the
defendant on the afternoon of Thursday, March 5, the day before
the hearing. R. 382-383. 14
14

Defendant' s counsel states he received the affidavit at
approximately 2:30 p. m. that Thursday.
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The University moved to strike the affidavit as
untimely under Rule 6(d) U. R. C. P. . and the trial court agreed.
This ruling was incorrect. Rule 6(d) U. R. C. P. allows affidavits
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be filed not
later than 1 day before the hearing, unless otherwise allowed by
the Court.

This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with

Rule 56(c) U. R. C. P. , which states: "The adverse party prior to
the date of hearing may serve opposing affidavits." (emphasis
added).

These rules by their terms permit affidavits in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be served at any
time prior to the day of hearing. Accord Beaufort Concrete Co.
yt Atlantic States CQnStfft COt , 352 F. 2d 460, 462 (5th Cir.
1965)(interpreting identical federal rules).

The affidavits

were timely as a matter of law.

B.

Dr. Cannot s Affidavit Was Otherwise Admissible.
The trial court also adopted without comment the

University's objections that Dr. Cannon's affidavit was
contradictory to his deposition testimony, and immaterial.
is neither. 15

It

Dr. Cannon' s affidavit stated that, at past

15

The immateriality objection should be disposed of summarily.
The University makes the circular objection that the affidavit is
immaterial because the University had no duty of care to the
-31g:\wpc\160\00001hzb.W51

University basketball games, he and his wife had used the same
crosswalk and had taken advantage of the assistance of
University police in crossing South Campus Drive. Para. 4, R.
383.

On the night in question, one reason that they used the

South Campus Drive parking lots and crosswalk was the
availability of police protection at the crosswalks. Para. 5.
On the night of the accident, they did not see the officers at
the crosswalk, but did see their automobile. 16 Dr. Cannon then
stated that, had the officers been available at the crosswalk,
the Cannons would have followed their directions.

In their

absence, the Cannons were forced to fend for themselves in
crossing the street. R. 383.
The University contends that these statements should
have been held inadmissible on the basis of Webster v. Still.
675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983). In Webster, the Utah Supreme Court
stated that when a party takes a clear position in a deposition,
he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own
Cannons. R. 421. However, the University7 s own arguments concern
the issues raised in the affidavit - e. g. reliance. The affidavit
clearly involves material issues; that is why the University seeks
to bar its admission.
16

The officers were inside the automobile at the time. This
is another indication of how dark the crosswalk area was, a fact
that should have led the officers to take additional precautions to
ensure pedestrian safety in the crossing.
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contradictory affidavit. 675 P. 2d at 1172-3.

Yet the Webster

court went on to state that this rule should be applied
cautiously, and only when there is an unequivocal contradiction
between deposition testimony and an affidavit. 675 P. 2 at 1173.
The Court of Appeals has exercised similar caution in refusing
to strike affidavits that could raise issues of fact.

Gaw v.

State bv and through DOT. 798 P. 2d 1130, 1140-1 (Utah App.
1990).
Upon review of the affidavit and the allegedly
inconsistent statements, it becomes apparent that there are no
inconsistencies of any consequence.

R. 383; cf. R. 422. In his

affidavit, Dr. Cannon stated that one of the reasons the Cannons
parked where they did was the availability of police assistance
in crossing South Campus Drive.

The University somehow argues

that this testimony was contradicted by his statement that he
and his wife would arrive early to get a good parking place and
avoid the crowds.

It similarly sees a contradiction in Dr.

Cannon' s testimony that other parking areas involved climbing
stairs.

These statements are neither directly contradictory to

nor mutually exclusive with his affidavit statement that one of
the reasons they parked where they did was the availability of
manned crosswalks.
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Summary judgment is a harsh remedy, and the court is
required to resolve all doubts in favor of the party opposing
the motion. Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977).

The

Utah Supreme Court in Webster made it clear that it is not the
task of the trial court to weigh evidence at the summary
judgment stage.

Unless the inconsistency is completely

implausible, it is the finder of fact that must weigh the
credibility of the explanation.

Gaw, supra. 798 P. 2d at 1141.

Accordingly, an affidavit should be disregarded only if there is
a direct and clear contradiction to prior testimony.
at 1172-3.

675 P. 2d

No such direct contradiction exists here; in fact,

there is no inconsistency whatsoever between Dr. Cannon' s
testimony and his affidavit.

The affidavit raised a clear and

material issue of fact concerning the Cannon' s reliance on the
officers' presence in choosing where to park.

The trial court

erred in striking Dr. Cannon' s affidavit.

c

The Lord Affidavit Should Also Have Been Admitted.
The affidavit of David Lord, the plaintiffs' traffic

safety expert, concerns the issue of proximate cause. In it he
states that his expert opinion was that, had the officers acted
in accordance with their assigned tasks and without negligence,
by stopping them or the oncoming vehicle, the Cannons would not
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have been injured.

R. 37-381.

As noted previously, the trial

court made no express ruling on the issue of proximate cause,
but did adopt the defendant' s memorandum.

R. 435.

The Court of Appeals, to the extent that it is
necessary to address proximate causation, can find a material
issue of fact on the issue of causation even without the Lord
Affidavit.

In virtually all cases, including this one,

causation is a factual issue to be determined by the jury.
Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Chenev, 706 P. 2d 614 (Utah 1985).
The Lord affidavit meets all the requirements for an expert' s
affidavit set forth in American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lockhead,
751 P. 2d 271 (Utah App. 1988), and clearly raises factual
questions concerning causation.

Even if it did not, the

officers' admitted failure to assist the Cannons raises the same
issues of fact.

Summary judgment is also improper on the

causation issue.

V.
THE CANNONS WERE BUSINESS INVITEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY, REQUIRING THE UNIVERSITY TO
EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO PROTECT THEIR
SAFETY
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The trial court rejected the Cannon's claims that the
University owed them a duty of care as business invitees because
the University does not own the roadway underlying the crosswalk
where the accident occurred.

The Cannons, as paying customers

of the University basketball program, were clearly business
invitees; mens basketball games are promoted to the public by
the University, with the purpose of raising attendance and
thereby ticket revenue. R. 371. gee Stevens v. Salt Lake County.
478 P. 2d 496, 498 (Utah 1970)(business invitee is one who goes
on the premises of another for some business of mutual
advantage).

With respect to such invitees, the business is

expected to exercise a high degree of care to assure their
safety.

Id. at 498.

The Court should note that the owner-

invitee relationship is a "special relationship" creating a duty
of care.
1983).

DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co. , 663 P. 2d 433, 435 (Utah
This relationship provides an entirely independent basis

for imposing a duty of care on the University. 17
The trial court denied the existence of a duty of care
to the Cannons as invitees because the Utah Department of

17

Those who attend university events for a fee stand in the
status of invitees. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College.
685 P. 2d 1193 (Cal. 1984); see also Cimino v. Yale University, 638
F. Supp. 952, 955 (D. Conn. 1986).
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Transportation ("UDOT"), not the University, owns South Campus
Drive.

R. 432.

The trial court' s reliance on ownership of the

street is misplaced.

Section 344 of the Restatement (2d) of

Torts makes it clear that occupancy, not ownership, of the
premises is the test for whether a special relationship arises:
A possessor of land who holds it open for
his business purposes is subject to
liability to members of the public while
they are on the land for such a purpose, for
physical harm caused bv the accidental,
negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of
thiyfl person? py {tnim»jLgg »nfl by the failure
of the possessor to exercise reasonable care
(b) give a warning adequate to
protect the visitors to avoid the
harm, or otherwise to protect them
against it.
Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 344 (emphasis added).
The University, through its officers, was in active
possession of the crosswalk at the time the accident occurred.
The University, not UDOT, had specifically undertaken to operate
the crosswalk in question.

UDOT was not shown to have any input

into how or when pedestrians would be provided with police
protection; that task was assumed solely by the University.
In light of the significant level of involvement that
the University had with the crosswalk, this is hardly an
expansion of the law governing invitees.
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The University

actively promotes public attendance at its basketball games. As
part of this activity, it makes parking lots on the south side
of South Campus Drive available to basketball fans.

To get to

the game, those fans must cross South Campus Drive.

The

University expressly recognized that this crossing posed a
danger to them, and assigned police to guard the crosswalks. In
a very real sense, it "held open" the crosswalk to its invitees
for its own business purposes. The fact that the University did
not hold title to the underlying roadway is irrelevant in light
of its recognition of the danger and its undertaking to provide
protection at the crosswalk for its invitees.

Under Restatement

§ 344 and the law of invitees, the University and its employees
had a duty of care towards the Cannons, a duty which they failed
to fulfil.
In finding that no invitee relationship existed, the
trial court also relied upon the Cannons' withdrawal of their
claim against the University based upon ownership of South
Campus Drive. R. 432.

This argument is misplaced.

The claim

withdrawn by the Cannons concerned the possible lack of adequate
signage and lighting at the crosswalk, an issue within the
admitted responsibility of UDOT.

This issue has no connection

with the University' s failure to use reasonable care to protect
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those invitees who were using a crosswalk staffed by University
employees to go to from a University parking lot to a University
sports facility.

The dismissal of the inadequate maintenance

claims is irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
There is little question that the University of Utah
recognized the danger to pedestrians arising from the use of the
Huntsman Center crosswalks prior to evening basketball games.
To alleviate this danger, it assigned University police to the
crosswalks to assist spectators in reaching the Huntsman Center.
On the evening of February 1, 1990, the University' s officers
utterly failed to comply with their assigned task, resulting in
devastating injuries to the Cannons.

The University is not

entitled to escape responsibility for its officers' negligent
performance of a duty that the University expressly assumed.
The University owed the Cannons a duty of care. The trial
court' s decision should be reversed, and the Cannons given an
opportunity to prove their case.
DATED this

i^

day of August, 1992.
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Michael F. Richman (4180)
John W. Andrews (4724)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be
hand-delivered this

j^

day of AUGUST, 1992, to the following:

Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

M. DALTON CANNON and
PATRICIA CANNON,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

Case No.

:

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

900902128 PI

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Defendant.

The Court having considered the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the various memoranda in support and in
opposition thereto, the Motion to Strike the Affidavits of M.
Dalton Cannon and David Lord and having heard oral argument in
regard to said matters and being fully advised in the premises
makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Motions to Strike are granted.

The memorandum were

filed untimely and in addition suffer the defects set forth in
defendant's Motion to Strike and in particular points two and
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three

which

the

Court

PAGE 2

adopts

as

MINUTE ENTRY

additional

basis

for

the

behalf

of

the

granting of said Motion.
The

Motion

for

Summary

defendant is likewise granted.

Judgment

on

The Court is of the opinion that

any duty which the University might have had in relation to
escorting people across the street at the point of the incident
involved in this case was at most a public duty.

It can be

argued that there was no public duty in that there is no showing
that

the

control

University
measures

circumstances.

at

had
the

The claim

any

obligation

particular
that

to

conduct

crosswalk

there was

a duty

traffic

under

any

because of

ownership has b€>en dropped by the plaintiff and the claim that
there is a duty because of a landlord/tenant or business invitee
concept does not stand up to scrutiny.

The plaintiffs now admit

that the University does not own the street where the incident
occured so therefore they can in no way be the landlord or the
tenant of said property it being a public road.

Secondly, the

plaintiff cannot boot strap a business invitee argument, even if
it were valid, from the premises of the defendant to a premises
the defendant does not own or occupy.

The place of the accident

was a public highway owned by the State of Utah and occupied
only by the State and it's citizens.
Returning to the question of duty, it is clear that the
University need not* have conducted any crossing walk activities
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had it chosen not to do so and in the event it had not, a member
of

the

public

complained.

injured

at

that

location

could

not

have

Under Ferree v. State, 784 P2d 149 (Utah, 1989) it

is clear that the duty breached which forms the basis of the
claim must be a duty owed specifically to the plaintiff and not
to a general member of the public.

The question that always

arises in these kinds of cases is the attempt to classify each
of the plaintiffs as falling within a given catagory.

In this

case the plaintiff attempts to classify as a member of a group
of people attending a basketball game at the University of Utah
or those persons crossing the roadway of this crosswalk.

The

Court

not

is

appropriate

of

the

and

opinion

that

does

that

such

not

create

classification
a

duty

is

running

to a

specific individual to wit: the plaintiffs in this case.

It

should be further noted that at the time and place of the
accident the University, through their officers, was not in fact
engaged in traffic control.
and there is sufficient

While the police car was present

evidence to believe that there were

flares burning in the crosswalk it was perfectly apparent that
the officers were not present and were not going to conduct the
plaintiffs across the intersection.
testimony

is undisputed

that

the

As a matter of fact the
plaintiffs

noted

that

the

officers were not present and would not be there to conduct them
across the road as had been done on other occasions.

Thereafter
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they proceeded to cross, as would anybody else, and the accident
occured without any further involvement from any agent of the
University

of Utah,

Thus the University was not engaged in

traffic control through their officers at the time and place of
the accident and they had no specific duty to do so on behalf of
the plaintiffs.

The fact that the officers had been assigned by

their superior the task of directing traffic, including helping
people cross the street does not extend the duty owed by the
University

or the officer under the law.

The scope of the

assigned task, even if not fulfilled by the agent, cannot extend
the

duty

of

circumstances.

the

privelge

to

a

third

party

under

these

For these reasons as well as those set forth in

the defendant's Memorandum in Support of it's Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Reply Memorandum in Support of it's Motion said
Motion will be granted.
Counsel

for the defendant

will prepare

an appropriate

order and summary judgment.
DATED this

JL

day of Marc

gldrtARD A.MbWn
DISTRICT O

nr\r\ .
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

/0

day of March, 1992:

Michael F. Richman
John W. Andrews
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P, 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Scott A, Call
Reeed M. Stringham
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorney for Defendant
23 6 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

